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THE AMBIT OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE  
AFTER THE EU ANTITRUST DAMAGES DIRECTIVE 
 
KATHRYN WRIGHT* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores how the EU Antitrust Damages Directive and linked initiatives affect the 
DPELWRIQDWLRQDOFRXUWV·FRPSHWHQFHIn particular, it focuses on the combination of the 
probative effect of national competition authority findings of infringement, the limitation of 
FRXUWV·SRZHUVRIGLVFORVXUH, and advice to national courts on quantum under the new Directive 
on damages actions for competition infringements, and European Commission and national 
competition authority opinions to national courts under existing Regulation 1/2003 on the 
enforcement of the EU competition rules. The article contributes to the understanding of the 
interaction of courts and regulatory authorities in the enforcement of EU law. It argues that 
while the Directive aims to increase actions for damages in national courts, and in one sense 
therefore empowers those courts, in a number of ways it also constrains their jurisdiction.  It 
finds that hard and soft law tools LQWHUDFWWROLPLWQDWLRQDOFRXUWV·FRPSHWHQFH 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article explores WKHDPELWRIQDWLRQDOFRXUWV·FRPSHWHQFHLQOLJKWRIWKHQHZ EU Directive 
on Antitrust Damages1 and linked initiatives. While the Directive aims to increase actions for 
damages in national courts, and in one sense therefore empowers those courts, in a number of 
ways it also constrains their jurisdiction. The Directive advances a number of provisions aimed at 
lessening the burden of proof for claimants who wish to bring a claim for breach of the EU 
competition rules, but also aiming at safeguarding public enforcement of competition law by 
authorities. These provisions include the probative effect of national competition authority 
infringement decisions on national courts,2 and limitations RQFRXUWV·SRZHUVRIGLVFORVXUH7KH
Directive is accompanied by guidance for courts on the calculation of quantum.3 The article 
evaluates the effect of these provisions alongside the existing Regulation 1/2003,4 which 
provided for the decentralized enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU5  by national 
competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts.  Among other provisions, this Regulation 
requires national courts not to take a decision running counter to one by the European 
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1
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union O.J. 2014 L 349/1. The Directive is due to come into force by the 
end of 2016. 
2
 Art. 9 Directive on Damages Actions ibid 
3
 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C(2013) 3440, O.J. 2013 C 167/19 
4
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 [now 101 and 102] of the Treaty, O.J. 2003 L 1/1 
5
 In particular the application of Art. 101(3), previously in the exclusive domain of the Commission. 
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Commission,6 and allows for the European Commission and national administrative authorities 
to provide opinions to national courts on how the law should be interpreted and applied.7 
 
As a result, a combination of hard law (rules on proof and disclosure) and soft law (opinions, 
guidance on quantum and disclosure) tools now interact to connect judges applying competition 
law in civil disputes with public enforcement by competition authorities. The article explores the 
impact of these tools on the ambit of judicial competence. Following this introduction, the 
second part of the article briefly lays out the context of regulatory governance, executive 
adjudication and civil courts. The third section tackles claimed threats to judicial independence 
and attempts to differentiate between judicial independence and judicial competence. Fourthly, 
the core of the article explores the hard and soft tools deriving from the recent Directive 
2014/104 on Antitrust Damages Actions and the earlier enforcement Regulation 1/2003: (prima 
facie) probative effect of national competition authority opinions to national courts; rules on 
disclosure; Commission and national competition authority opinions to national courts on the 
interpretation and application of EU law; and advice to courts on quantum and disclosure. The 
article then comes to some conclusions about the impact of these tools on the ambit of judicial 
competence.  
 
 
2. REGULATORY GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION AND CIVIL 
COURTS 
 
Courts do not have a monopoly on the interpretation of the law.8 Executive authorities in EU 
competition enforcement have adjudicative functions. At the systemic level, the European 
Commission has a legislative role in issuing guidelines and notices, but these instruments also 
serve a judicial ² interpretative ² function. The European &RPPLVVLRQ·VMXGLFLDOIXQFWLRQDWWKH
systemic level is expressed through soft law.9 It can establish the rules and elucidate its 
interpretation of EU law through notices and guidelines. At the single case level, the 
Commission and NCAs have adjudicative functions, finding infringements and imposing 
sanctions.  
The EU competition regime operates in the context of multilevel regulatory governance.10 
Functions are shared between different institutions, necessitating cooperative processes. One 
feature of regulatory governance is the rise of regulatory agencies and networks between them.  
This implies lesser importance of judicial adjudicative processes, and invites reconsideration of 
                                                          
6
 Art. 16 Regulation 1/2003 supra QFRGLI\LQJWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶VUXOLQJLQMasterfoods: C-344/98 
Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369, at para. 60. 
7
 Art. 15 Regulation 1/2003 supra n. 4; Art. 6 Directive 2014/104 specifically relating to disclosure 
8
 6HHHJ&RPPHQWVRI00DGXURLQµ)RXU9LVLRQVRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3OXUDOLVPV\PSRVLXPWUDQVFULSW¶
2(1) European Journal of Legal Studies 325, p. 331 
9
 6RIWODZLVGHILQHGDV³UXOHVRIFRQGXFWWKDWDUHODLGGRZQLQLQVWUXPHQWVZKLFKKDYHQRWEHHQDWWULEXWHG
legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at 
and may SURGXFHSUDFWLFDOHIIHFWV´L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, 2004) p. 112, 
GHYHORSHGIURP)6Q\GHUµ7KH(IIHFWLYHQHVVRI(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\/DZ,QVWLWXWLRQV3URFHVVHV7RROVDQG
7HFKQLTXHV¶Modern Law Review S³UXOHVRIFRQGXFWZKLFKLQSULQFLSOHKDYHQROHJDOO\
ELQGLQJIRUFHEXWZKLFKQHYHUWKHOHVVPD\KDYHSUDFWLFDOHIIHFWV´ 
10
 55KRGHVµ7KH1HZ*RYHUQDQFH*RYHUQLQJZLWKRXW*RYHUQPHQW¶Political Studies 652; M. 
Egeberg Multilevel Union Administration: The Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe 
(PalgraveMacmillan, 2006); C. 6DEHO	-=HLWOLQµLearning from Difference: the New Architecture of 
([SHULPHQWDOLVW*RYHUQDQFHLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶(2008) 14(3) European Law Journal 271; D. Coen & M. 
7KDWFKHUµ1HWZRUN*RYHUQDQFHDQG0XOWL-OHYHO'HOHJDWLRQ(XURSHDQ1HWZRUNVRI5HJXODWRU\$JHQFLHV¶
28(1) Journal of Public Policy 49; M. Blauberger & B. Rittberger µConceptualizing and Theorizing EU 
Regulatory Networks' (2014) Regulation & Governance DOI:10.1111/rego.12064 
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the judicial role. 11 It has been argued that tKHULVHRIUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHVDQG¶MXULVGLFWLRQDO
SRZHU·has RFFXUUHGDWWKHH[SHQVHRI¶MXULVSUXGHQWLDOSRZHU·.12  
In competition law, executive powers between the supranational and national level are well 
linked, as an example of an integrated administration. 13 Public enforcers ² NCAs and the 
Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission ² are linked through the 
European Competition Network (ECN) with its rules for case allocation, cooperation and 
consistent application of the competition rules. 14 However, civil courts engaged in disputes 
between private parties and providing remedies - and review or appeal courts - are not part of 
this Network.15 This is for the practical reason that there are numerous judges throughout the 
EU who could hear competition claims; but also more importantly from a constitutional 
perspective, it could be seen to interfere with principles of judicial independence and national 
procedural autonomy.   Nonetheless various mechanisms, discussed below, have been developed 
which indirectly connect courts to the ECN.   
The interaction between public and private enforcement in competition law involves a trade-off 
between judicial autonomy and the effectiveness of public enforcement by the European 
Commission and national competition authorities.  This balance is particularly brought into relief 
ZKHUHFODLPDQWVLQFLYLODFWLRQVVHHNGRFXPHQWVKHOGRQDFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\·VILOHFirms are 
less likely to come forward and admit anticompetitive conduct under a leniency programme if 
that admission will then be used against them in private actions for damages.16 Ensuring that 
public and private enforcement are complementary is therefore a delicate balance. 17 This trade-
off raises broader questions about the partnership and tensions between judicial and 
administrative bodies, administrative intervention in judicial decision-making and the role of soft 
law in a system in which the Commission has legislative, executive, as well as adjudicative 
functions. 18  
 
                                                          
11
 -6FRWW	66WXUPµ&RXUWVDV&DWDO\VWV5H-7KLQNLQJWKH-XGLFLDO5ROHLQ1HZ*RYHUQDQFH¶Columbia 
Journal of European Law (2006-7) 565 
12
 /$]RXODLµ7KH-XGJHDQGWKH&RPPXQLW\¶V$GPLQLVWUDWLYH*RYHUQDQFH¶LQ C. Joerges & R. Dehousse (eds) 
*RRG*RYHUQDQFHLQ(XURSH¶V,QWHJUDWHG0DUNHW (OUP, 2002) 109-/$]RXODLµ7KH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH
DQGWKH&RPPXQLW\¶V$GPLQLVWUDWLYH*RYHUQDQFH¶European Law Journal 425, p.428  
13
 H. Hofmann & A. Türk 'The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences' 
(2007) 13 (2) European Law Journal 253-271; P. Van Cleynenbreugel Market Supervision in the European 
Union: Integrated Administration in Constitutional Context (Brill Nijhoff, 2014) 
14
 Notice on co-operation within the Network of Competition Authorities O.J. 2004 C 101/43  
15
 Courts act in different capacities in the system. This contribution considers the role of national courts in 
private enforcement of competition law in which they apply the law directly in disputes between private parties, 
but national courts can also be designated national competition authorities in a public enforcement function 
pursuant to Art. 35 of Regulation 1/2003, or they can act in a judicial review function. 
16
 The issue in C-360/09 Pfleiderer A.G. v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161 and C-536/11 
Bundeswettbewerbsbehorde v Donau Chemie AG EU:C:2013:366, discussed infra. 
17
 See e.g. &&DXIIPDQµ7KH,QWHUDFWLRQRI/HQLHQF\3URJUDPPHVDQG'DPDJHV$FWLRQV¶
Competition Law Review ::LOVµ6KRXOG3ULYDWH$QWLWUXVW(QIRUFHPHQW%H(QFRXUDJHGLQ(XURSH"¶
(2003) 26(3) World Competition &-RQHVµ3ULYDWH$QWLWUXVW(QIRUFHPent in Europe: A Policy Analysis and 
5HDOLW\&KHFN¶World Competition $.RPQLQRVµ3XEOLFDQG3ULYDWH$QWLWUXVW(QIRUFHPHQWLQ
(XURSH&RPSOHPHQW"2YHUODS"¶Competition Law Review ::LOVµ7KH5HODWLRQVKLS%HWZHHQ
Public AntLWUXVW(QIRUFHPHQWDQG3ULYDWH$FWLRQVIRU'DPDJHV¶World Competition 3  
18
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH::LOVµ7KH&RPELQDWLRQRIWKH,QYHVWLJDWLYHDQG3URVHFXWRULDO)XQFWLRQDQGWKH
Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and EconomLF$QDO\VLV¶World 
Competition 201 
4 
 
The principal aim of the directive on damages actions,19 and the earlier 2004 reform20, is to 
encourage private enforcement of competition law by firms and individuals through national 
courts, without compromising public enforcement through competition authorities. By 
encouraging enforcement in national courts as well as by competition authorities, the door is 
RSHQWRFODLPDQWVWRDFWDVHQIRUFHUV¶SULYDWHDWWRUQH\JHQHUDOV·21) closest to infringements. It 
also allows those who suffer losses as a result of competition law infringements to gain 
individual redress ² while they can impose fines, competition authorities are less well placed to 
compensate individuals who are harmed by competition law breaches. 
 
 
3. JUDICIAL AUTONOMY OR JUDICIAL COMPETENCE? 
 
This section explores the relationship between the concept of judicial autonomy and the ambit 
of judicial competence. There are different understandings of judicial autonomy. On one level, 
judicial independence means that the judiciary as a whole is independent from other branches of 
government. Objective impartiality is an important element of this ² the judge must not only be 
independent, but be seen to be independent.22  Another aspect of the understanding of judicial 
independence is WKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHMXGJH·Vdecision-making from interference at case level. In 
competition law, this debate has centred on adequacy of judicial review, and the right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal under Article 47 of the EU Charter and Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.23 The case law of Art. 6(1) ECHR on the meaning of independent and impartial tribunal 
incorporates (a) the principle that a judge should be free to take decisions on all the  relevant 
issues of fact and law issues before her (b) without pressure or influence being exerted by any 
outside authority, agency or individual.  
 
                                                          
19
 Commission White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165 final, 2 
Apr. 2008, p. 4. See also Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC (2008) 404, 2 Apr. 2008, paras. 39 et seq. 
20
 The modernisation package of Regulation 1/2003, supra n. 4, and accompanying measures: Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission 
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, O.J. 2004 L 123/18; Commission Notice on cooperation within 
the Network of Competition Authorities O.J. 2004 C 101/43; Commission Notice on the co-operation between 
the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC O.J. 2004 
C 101/54; Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty O.J. 2004 C 101/65; Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters) O.J. 2004 C 101/78; 
Commission Notice - Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
O.J. 2004 C 101/81; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty O.J. 2004 
C 101/97 
21
 see e.g. A. Andreangeli 'From Complainant to "Private Attorney General": the Modernisation of EU 
Competition Enforcement and Private Antitrust Action before National Courts' in J. Peay and T. Newburn (eds) 
Policing: Politics, Culture and Control. Essays in Honour of Robert Reiner (Hart Publishing, 2012) 229-54; K. 
&VHUHVµ*RYHUQDQFH'HVLJQIRU(XURSHDQ Private Law: Lessons from the Europeanization of Competition Law 
LQ&HQWUDODQG(DVWHUQ(XURSH¶LQ)&DIDJJLHGMaking European Private Law: Governance Design (Edward 
Elgar, 2008) 138-196,  p. 143 
22
 Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom (Application no. 7819/77; 7878/77) 28 Jun. 1984 ECtHR  
23
 Particularly on whether adjudication by a competition authority meets the requirements of an independent and 
impartial tribunal, e.g. Menarini Diagnostics s.r.l. v. Italy, (Application no. 43509/08) 27 Sep. 2011 ECtHR, 
especially dissenting opinion; and in the Court of Justice of the European Union C-389/10 P KME v. 
Commission [2011] ECR I-13125; C-501/11 P Schindler Holding and Others v. Commission EU:C:2013:522, 
SDUD::LOVµ7KH&RPELQDWLRQRIWKH,QYHVWLJDWLYH and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative 
)XQFWLRQLQ(&$QWLWUXVW(QIRUFHPHQW$/HJDODQG(FRQRPLF$QDO\VLV¶World Competition 201; 
,)RUUHVWHUµ$%XVKLQ1HHGRI3UXQLQJWKH/X[XULDQW*URZWKRI/LJKW-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ¶LQ&-D. Ehlermann & 
M. Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review 
in Competition Cases (Hart, 2011), pp. 412-13  
5 
 
A number of initial objections to the proposal for the EU Directive on Damages Actions 
centred on the constitutional principle of judicial autonomy. For example, the proposal to render 
the decisions of administrative authorities binding on the judiciary was considered in conflict 
with the principle of judicial independence by a number of Member States.24This is the reason 
why the proposed binding effect of domestic and foreign NCA findings of infringement was 
rejected in the adopted version of the directive, and explains the final formulation discussed in 
more detail below: GRPHVWLF1&$GHFLVLRQV´LUUHIXWDEO\µHVWDEOLVKLQg an infringement, with the 
decision of a foreign NCA constituting prima facie evidence. 
Judicial autonomy has also been raised in the context of damages actions. In the Otis case the 
European Commission was itself a claimant following its own finding of a breach of Art 101 
TFEU in the lift and elevators cartel.25 Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 and 
Masterfoods,26 WKH%HOJLDQFRXUWZDVERXQGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VILQGLQJRILQIULQJHPHQWDQG
could not consider all relevant questions of fact and law as required under Art 47 EU Charter on 
access to a tribunal. There were also questions of equality of arms and the Commission acting as 
judge in its own cause. In Otis, WKH&-(8·Vpreliminary ruling discussed judicial independence in 
the context of the Court of Justice·VMXGLFLDOUHYLHZDQGWKHLPSDUWLDOLW\RIWKHCJEU, not the 
national court.27 The Advocate General explicitly drew a distinction between judicial 
independence and the scope of the national FRXUW·VMXULVGLFWLRQ´WKHTXHVWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKH
indHSHQGHQFHRIWKHFRPSHWHQWQDWLRQDOFRXUW«UHIHUVWRWKHVFRSHRIMXULVGLFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWR
MXGLFLDOLPSDUWLDOLW\µ28  The Advocate General discussed the question of whether a decision of an 
(8LQVWLWXWLRQKHUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQ´XQMXVWLILDEO\GHSULYHV«FRXrts of their independence 
[emphasis in original] when they are called upon to determine a claim for damages based on that 
GHFLVLRQµHe went on to state that ´1RQHRIWKHSDUWLHVLQWKHVHSURFHHGLQJVGRXEWVWKH
impartiality of the referring court; nor is there any question of extra-legal and unlawful 
LQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPDLQSURFHHGLQJV5DWKHUWKHGRXEWVUHIHU«WRWKHscope 
RIWKHUHIHUULQJFRXUW·VMXULVGLFWLRQµ29 Therefore ´«WKH[national court] does not find its jurisdiction 
limited, but it exercises it[s jurisdiction] within the framework of an ordinary division of roles 
EHWZHHQWKHQDWLRQDODQG(XURSHDQ8QLRQFRXUWVµ30  
The Advocate General considered that in Masterfoods, the Court of Justice itself defined the scope 
of the CommissioQ·VGHFLVLRQVDQGWKHUHVSHFWLYHUROHVRIWKH Commission and national courts.31 
While recognising that the national court has to accept that a prohibited practice exists due to the 
obligation not to take decisions running counter to a finding of infringement by the 
Commission, both the Advocate General and the Court underlined WKHQDWLRQDOFRXUW·V
UHPDLQLQJMXULVGLFWLRQ´WKHH[LVWHQFHRIORVVDQGRIDGLUHFWFDXVDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHORVVDQGWKH
agreement or practice in question remains...a matter to be assessed by the national courtµ32; ´WR
GHFODUHDQGTXDQWLI\WKHGDPDJHVXIIHUHG«DIWHUHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHFDXVDOOLQNDWDVNZKLFK
                                                          
24
 In particular France and Italy ± see discussion in the text to n.48 infra 
25
  Commission Decision C (2007) 512 final of 21 Feb.2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC (Case 
COMP/E-í(OHYDWRUVDQG(VFDODWRUVVXPPDU\LQ2-&&-199/11 European 
Commission v. Otis NV and others EU:C:2012:684. For a discussion of the issues in Otis see e.g. M. Botta, 
µ&RPPLVVLRQDFWLQJDVSODLQWLIILQFDVHVRISULYDWHHQIRUFHPHQWRI(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZOtis Case C-199/11, 
European Commission v. Otis NV and others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 6 
1RYHPEHUQ\U¶Common Market Law Review 1105 
26
 Supra n. 6 
27Ibid. Otis judgment, para. 55 et seq 
28
 Ibid. Otis opinion of Advocate General EU:C:2012:388, para. 37 
29
 Ibid. Otis opinion of Advocate General, para. 43 (emphasis in original) 
30
 Ibid. Otis opinion of Advocate General, para. 45 
31
 Otis opinion of Advocate General, para. 49, following Masterfoods supra n. 6 
32
 Otis judgment, para. 65 
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involves a detailed DQGFRPSOH[MXGLFLDODQDO\VLVµ.33  The task of establishing the causal link is 
presented arguably as something of D¶FRQVRODWLRQSUL]H·JLYHQWKHORVVRIIXUWKHUMXGLFLDO
competence. 
If judicial independence is viewed not as a static notion but as a functional concept,34 it is a 
means to an end, and must therefore be assessed in relation to the result which is sought. The 
result in this context is effective enforcement of the competition rules. If we accept this 
functional definition, judicial independence LVQRWWKUHDWHQHG+RZHYHUWKHVFRSHRIWKHFRXUWV·
jurisdiction is certainly affected. 
 
4. TOOLS FOR THE INTERACTION OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES AND CIVIL 
COURTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON JUDICIAL COMPETENCE 
 
We now turn to the recent legislative developments in the Directive on damages actions for 
breach of the EU competition rules,35 their relationship with the existing provisions in 
Regulation 1/2003, and the scope of the FLYLOFRXUWV·UROH 
 
4.1 THE DIRECTIVE ON DAMAGES ACTIONS 
 
Complementing public enforcement by DG Competition and national competition authorities, 
the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions aims to stimulate private enforcement of EU 
competition law in national courts by enabling victims of infringements of EU competition law 
to exercise their rights to compensation.36 Following the earlier White37 and Green Papers,38 it 
includes PHDVXUHVRQSDUWLHV·VWDQGLQJWREULQJDFODLPdisclosure and access to evidence, effect 
of national decisions, liability, limitation periods, definition of damages and dispute resolution. In 
exploring the narrowing of judicial competence, this article will focus on the effect of NCA 
infringement decisions, disclosure of evidence, and provisions for competition authorities to 
advise judges on disclosure and quantum. 
 
4.1.1 RECOGNITION AND EFFECT OF NATIONAL COMPETITION AUTHORITY 
DECISIONS 
 
Article 9 of the Directive deems a NCA·V finding of infringement to constitute irrefutable proof 
in damages actions for breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in courts of that same Member 
State. NCA decisions from another Member State need to be recognized aV´DWOHDVWprima facie 
HYLGHQFHµRIDQLQIULQJHPHQW, which may then be assessed alongside other evidence presented by 
the parties. 39 An infringement of competition law found by a final decision of a national 
                                                          
33
 Otis opinion of Advocate General, para. 54 
34
 A Seibert-)RKUµ(XURSHDQ&RPSDUDWLYH3HUVSHFWLYHVRQWKH5XOHRI/DZDQG,QGHSHQGHQW&RXUWV¶LQ+
Eberhard et al (eds) Critical Perspectives on the Rule of Law. Proceedings of the 6th Vienna Workshop on 
International Constitutional Law (Facultas, 2010) 
35
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union O.J. 2014 L 349/1 
36
 The CJEU has laid the ground for private enforcement through C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR 
I-6297; C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I-6619; C-557/12 Kone EU:C:2014:1317 
37
 Supra n. 19 
38
 Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, 19 Dec.2005 
39
 7KHILQDODGRSWHGWH[WUHDGV³0HPEHU6WDWHVVKDOOHQVXUHWKDWDQLQIULQJHPHQWRIFRPSHWLWLRQODZIRXQGE\
a final decision of a national competition authority or a review court is deemed to be irrefutably established for 
the purposes of an action for damages brought before their national courts under Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty 
or under national competition law.  
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competition authority or a review court40 would be considered res judicata, preventing re-litigation 
of the same issues which had been decided upon in the public enforcement proceedings.41  
 
The rule providing for the probative effect of NCA findings of infringement on courts 
throughout all Member States is clearly promoted in the context of the Directive as a whole:  its 
aims are to encourage damages actions by alleviating the burden of proof on the claimant, 
avoiding re-litigation of issues; and promoting consistent application of the competition rules.  
However, it also has an effect on the judicial competence of civil courts.  
 
The explicit basis for the rule is an extension to NCA decisions of the Masterfoods judgment42 
already codified in Article 16 Reg 1/2003, which obliges EU Member State courts not to take 
decisions running counter to one made or contemplated by the European Commission. The 
original proposal provided for the cross-border binding effect of NCA decisions on national 
courts throughout the EU. 43 Following amendments to the original proposal and the final 
compromise in the Council and the European Parliament, the Directive limits the effect of 
national competition authority decisions to that of prima facie evidence.  
 
From the 2005 Green Paper44, the Commission rejected the option of the NCA infringement 
decision creating only a rebuttable presumption in damages actions, which had been proposed as 
a concession to judicial independence, rather than irrefutable proof. The fact that the final 
$UWLFOHLVHQWLWOHG¶(IIHFWRIQDWLRQDOGHFLVLRQV·ZLWKRXWWKHXVHRIWKHZRUG¶ELQGLQJ·which was 
used in the subsequent White Paper45 suggests sensitivity to the controversies. The final text 
states that an infringement shall be ´irrefutably establishedµ as a result of a NCA decision, not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2. Member States shall ensure that where a final decision referred to in paragraph 1 is taken in another Member 
State, that final decision may, in accordance with national law, be presented before their national courts as at 
least prima facie evidence that an infringement of competition law has occurred and, as appropriate, may be 
assessed along with any other evidence adduced by the parties. 
7KLVSURYLVLRQLVZLWKRXWSUHMXGLFHWRWKHULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH7UHDW\´6HHDOVR
Council Document 8088/14, Interinstitutional File 2013/0185 (COD), 24 Mar. 2014, Note from the General 
Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent Representatives Committee, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union - Analysis of 
the final compromise text with a view to agreement. 
40
 The final decision may therefore be FRQILUPDWLRQRIWKH1&$¶VGHFLVLRQDWUHYLHZRUDSSHDOrather than a 
direct decision of a NCA. 
41
 See recital 25 of Directive 2014/104 
42
 Supra n. 6  
43
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ&20ILQDO&2'³$UWLFOH(IIHFWRIQDWLRQDO
decisions: Member States shall ensure that, where national courts rule, in actions for damages under 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty or under national competition law, on agreements, decisions or practices which 
are already the subject of a final infringement decision by a national competition authority or by a review court, 
those courts cannot take decisions running counter to such finding of an infringement. This obligation is without 
SUHMXGLFHWRWKHULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH7UHDW\´ 
44
 Supra n. 38  
45
 Supra n. 19. In the White Paper 6HFWLRQµ%LQGLQJHIIHFWRI1&$GHFLVLRQV¶DQGWKHDFFRPSDQ\LQJ
&RPPLVVLRQ6WDIIZRUNLQJSDSHU6(&&KDSWHUµ%LQGLQJHIIHFWRIGHFLVLRQVDGRSWHGE\
FRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULWLHV¶For a discussion see  .:ULJKWµ%LQGLQJWKH Judicial with the Administrative: Some 
$VSHFWVRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V:KLWH3DSHURQ'DPDJHV$FWLRQVIRU%UHDFKRI(&$QWLWUXVW5XOHV¶
(2008) European Current Law, Nov. 2008 xi-[Y(7UXOLµ:KLWH3DSHURQ'DPDJHV$FWLRQVIRU%UHDFKRIWKH
EC AntitrXVW5XOHV7KH%LQGLQJ(IIHFWRI'HFLVLRQV$GRSWHGE\1DWLRQDO&RPSHWLWLRQ$XWKRULWLHV¶
European Competition Journal 795 
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¶ELQGLQJ·. ,QSUDFWLFHWKLVPD\KDYHWKHVDPH¶ELQGLQJ·HIIHFWEXWVHPDQWLFDOO\UHVSHFWVWKH
autonomous competence of the court to make a ruling.46  
 
The original proposal made no distinction between the effect of domestic and foreign NCA 
GHFLVLRQV)RUH[DPSOHLQ0HPEHU6WDWH$·VFRXUWVWKHLQIULQJHPHQWGHFLVLRQRI0HPEHU6WDWH
%·V1&$ZRXOGKDYHhad the same binding effect as a decision of WKH¶KRPH·1&$IURP
Member State A. The final wording denotes different effects for domestic and foreign NCA 
decisions and a weaker cross-border effect for NCA decisions than was originally proposed. It 
does however make reference to decisions based on national competition law, and not only 
European competition law as originally proposed. The only Member State currently to accept the 
cross-border binding effect of foreign NCA decisions is Germany under s.33(4) of the Act against 
Restraints of Competition, a provision which the Commission clearly drew upon in its drafting 
of the original proposal.47 
 
The article as drafted in the White Paper made specific reference to the European Competition 
Network, implying the legitimacy of a decision made by a NCA within the ECN with the tacit 
approval of the Commission and fellow NCAs. In the final text, the reference to the European 
Competition Network is played down and more emphasis is placed on the role of review courts.  
However, the importance of the ECN is highlighted in Recital 25 of the Damages Directive, 
where there is clear reference to Article 11 Regulation 1/2003 provisions central to the 
European Competition Network: 
 
´«>'@Hcisions are adopted only after the Commission has been informed of the envisaged 
decision RU«any other document indicating the proposed course of action pursuant to Article 
11(4) of Regulation 1/2003, and if the Commission has not relieved the national competition 
authority of its competence by initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of the same 
Regulation.µ 
 
Responses to the original White Paper consultation suggested that passage of even a domestic 
binding effect rule would be difficult due to concerns over judicial autonomy and the effects of 
the rule on internal Member State institutional structures. Several contributions strongly stated 
that to bring the proposed rule into effect would require constitutional change, as it was against 
the fundamental notion of judicial independence and lack of hierarchy of administrative 
institutions over the judiciary. 48  
                                                          
46
  See responses to the White Paper at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html (last accessed 29.7.2015). 
The Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione and Luxembourg Conseil de la Concurrence, Inspection de la 
Concurrence responses to the White Paper on damages actions proposed that out of respect for separation of 
SRZHUVLWLVQRWDGYLVDEOHWRXVHµELQGLQJ¶EXWIRUH[DPSOH³SUpVRPSWLRQLUUpIUDJDEOHSUpVRPSWLRQSDUODTXHOOH
OHMXJHHWOHVSDUWLHVVHURQWOLpV´$V0LOXWLQRYLFSXWVLWWKHMXGJH ³PXVWWUHDWWKHH[LVWHQFHRILOOHJDOFRQGXFW
DQGWKHLGHQWLW\RIWKHSHUSHWUDWRUVDVDJLYHQ´90LOXWLQRYLFµ$)UHVK/RRNDWBRT v SABAM and its 
6XEVHTXHQW,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶LQEuropean Competition Law Annual 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law - Implications for Courts and Agencies (Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 353) 
47
 s.33(4) of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), Act against Restraints of Competition: 
English version available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html (last accessed 
6HH::XUPQHVWµ$1HZ(UDIRU3ULYDWH$QWLWUXVW/LWLJDWLRQLQ*HUPDQ\"$&ULWLFDO$SSUDLVDORI
WKH0RGHUQL]HG/DZDJDLQVW5HVWUDLQWVRI&RPSHWLWLRQ¶ German Law Journal 1173 
48
 Supra n. 43. For example, the Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione has held in a number of cases that NCA 
findings of infringement are not binding ± a court hearing a damages claim is free to hear all evidence again and 
make the opposite finding. Furthermore, courts are not required to suspend their proceedings pending the 
outcome of an investigation in the Italian NCA. E.g. Assne Provinciale dei Consultenti del Lavoro di Treviso 
(case no. 3640, 13.2.2009); PA v AXA Assicuranzi SPA (case no. 19262, 22.9.2011). From a French perspective, 
opponents of the proposal drew attention to the judicial independence principle in the French constitution: see 
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As things stand, all Member States provide for decisions of national competition authorities to 
be submitted as evidence in civil court proceedings. 49 However, these decisions or other 
evidence from domestic competition authorities are not considered DV¶LUUHIXWDEOHSURRI·in all 
Member States and the first part of Article 9 of the Directive will therefore require reform at 
national level. In some Member States the NCA decisions may only be one element among other 
types of evidence that the judge can take into account (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg); it may 
be a particularly persuasive piece of evidence, either legally or in practice (e.g. Belgium, Lithuania, 
Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Denmark, Italy, Finland, France); or the decision may give rise to a 
rebuttable presumption of (non)-infringement, open to the other party to challenge with their 
own evidence. In other Member States the national competiWLRQDXWKRULW\·VGHFLVLRQLV already 
formally binding, leaving no room to reopen an investigation into the finding of infringement 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Austria, UK, Greece); or even foreign NCA decisions may be 
ELQGLQJRQDFRXUWLQWKH¶KRPH·0HPEHU6WDWH (Germany).50 Consequently there are different 
degrees of persuasiveness in the Member States. In some States it also depends on the type of 
decision (e.g. including a finding of no infringement as well as findings of infringement), and, 
where several bodies are designated NCAs, which of those bodies made the decision.  
 
In terms of the cross-border element of the rule, there was also the problem of different 
standards of appeal and judicial review in Member States. Concerning the prima facie evidence 
of infringement from another Member SWDWH·VNCA, judges might decide to afford less weight to 
this evidence if procedural standards, such as the level of scrutiny at appeal, are lower than in the 
FRXUW·V0HPEHU6WDWH51 Some Member States may provide for full reinvestigation of the facts, in 
which the court can substitute its own decision for that of the competition authorities. Other 
Member States may adhere to a judicial review which does not allow for a full re-examination. 
7KHMXGJHLQ0HPEHU6WDWH%ZKRLVWDNLQJ1&$$·VGHFLVLRQDVHYLGHQFHPD\want to be 
assured that the procedural standards both at the investigation stage in the NCA, and at the 
appeal stage, are on a par with those in Member State B.  
 
The Recast Brussels Regulation 1215/2012, although related to recognition of court judgments, 
can provide a template for the conditions in which a national court could look into DQ1&$·V
decision. It is also indirectly relevant to how heavily the judge will weigh the prima facie proof of 
a foreign NCA decision. Article 45 of the Recast Regulation allows an interested party to apply 
for refusal of recognition of a judgment if such recognition would be against public policy, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
e.g. Association des Avocats Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence White Paper response, p 12. According to 
the Portuguese Competition Authority, there would also be constitutional obstacles in Portugal based on 
separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, meaning that an NCA decision would need to be 
actively confirmed by a court (Autoridade da Concorrência Portuguesa response to White Paper on damages 
actions). In Sweden, ³>Q@RSXEOLFDXWKRULW\LQFOXGLQJWKH6ZHGLVK3DUOLDPHQWPD\GHWHUPLQHKRZDFRXUWRI
ODZLVWRDGMXGLFDWHDQLQGLYLGXDOFDVHRURWKHUZLVHDSSO\DUXOHRIODZLQDSDUWLFXODUFDVH´The Instrument of 
Government, Section 11:2, as reported in FIDE 2010 country report: G. C. Rodriguez Iglesias & L. Ortiz Blanco 
(eds.) The Judicial Application of Competition Law. Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid Vol. 2 
(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho de la Univ. Complutense de Madrid, 2010) 
49
 See for example Ashurst comparative report prepared by D. Waelbroeck, D. Slater and G. Even-Shoshan: 
Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules 31 Aug. 2004, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html,  p. 69; the independent study 
SUHSDUHGE\/HDUIRUWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶V(FRQRPLFDQG0RQHWDU\$IIDLUV&Rmmittee, Collective Redress 
in Antitrust, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, PE 475.120, 12 Jun. 2012, pp. 24-25 and the FIDE country reports 2010, 
ibid., in particular responses to questions 9,10,11,12,13,15,31,33.  
50
 Supra n. 47  
51
 In an analogy with Art. 45 of the Recast Brussels Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 2013 L 351/9, discussed infra 
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procedural guarantees were not adhered to. For the judgment to be recognized it must concern 
the same cause of action and the same parties. 
 
The question of precisely which part of the (Commission) decision must be followed by national 
courts remained ambiguous following Masterfoods52 and Crehan,53 but to an extent this is addressed 
in Recital 25 of the new Directive concerning the scope of NCA decisions. According to that 
Recital, ´7KHHIIHFWRIWKHILQGLQJVKRXOG«only cover the nature of the infringement as well as 
its material, personal, temporal and territorial scope as it was found by the competition authority 
or review court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.µ 5HODWHGWRWKHLURZQ1&$·VGHFLVLRQVQDWLRQDO
courts would not be permitted to reinvestigate the facts which led to the finding of infringement. 
However, national judges could resist this restriction of competence via issues of scope.  
 
Firstly, the wording of Article 9 of the Damages Directive states that the infringement shall be 
SURYHG´IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIDQDFWLRQIRUGDPDJHVµThe civil court would still have full 
jurisdiction in stand-alone (as opposed to follow-on) cases where a plaintiff brings a case directly 
to court without an existing NCA investigation and attempts to prove the infringement herself. 
The court would also have jurisdiction on applications for other types of remedy such as 
declarations under Art 101(2) TFEU for nullity, and injunction applications. Courts would have 
jurisdiction in interim proceedings. Indeed, this would be an argument for NCAs following the 
FRXUW·VILQGLQJVUDWKHUWKDn the vice versa solution proposed in the Directive. 
 
Secondly, only WKH´ILQDOGHFLVLRQRIDQ1&$RUUHYLHZFRXUWµLVUHOHYDQW.54 According to Article 
2 (12RIWKH'LUHFWLYH¶ILQDOLQIULQJHPHQWGHFLVLRQ·PHDQV´DQLQIULQJHPHQWGHFLVLRQWKDWFDQQRW, 
or can no longer, EHDSSHDOHGE\RUGLQDU\PHDQVµThis implies that before limitation periods 
for appeal are over, even if an infringement decision had been reached, a national court would be 
free to revisit the facts of the case.  
 
Thirdly, whereas the national court has an obligation to stay proceedings pending a Commission 
decision by virtue of Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, it would not have the same obligation, 
according to EU law, in respect of a contemplated NCA decision. In the White Paper,  if an 
appeal was pending national civil courts were ´HQFRXUDJHGWRFRQVLGHUµwhether staying their 
proceedings was appropriate.55 In light of the fact that ¶IRUHLJQ·NCA decisions will be only 
prima facie evidence, iIDIRUHLJQ1&$·VGHFLVLRQLVQRW\HW¶ILQDO·WKLVcould be a further reason 
for a judge to use her discretion to accord even less weight to that finding. 
 
Unintended consequences of the Directive imply an asymmetry between the effects of decisions 
of administrative bodies undertaking public enforcement in the ECN on competition authorities 
and those on civil courts. Despite the provisions of Article 11 providing for Member States to 
notify each other when they open an investigation (11(3)), and to share an envisaged decision 30 
days before it is adopted (11(4)), Regulation 1/2003 does not directly address the question of 
recognition or enforcemeQWRIRWKHU1&$V·GHFLVLRQV.  The closest provision to one of mutual 
recognition is Article 13 Regulation 1/2003 which gives a NCA grounds to suspend or refuse to 
open proceedings if another NCA is dealing with the case. 
 
                                                          
52
 Supra n. 6 
53
 Supra n. 36 
54
 White Paper on Damages Action, p. 5 and Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, para. 149, 
supra n. 45 
55
 Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, para. 157, supra n. 45  
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The provisions of Regulation 1/2003 and its accompanying Network Notice56 were drafted so 
that positive decisions at national level formally do not have a persuasive effect on other 
Member State NCAs. This was explicitly stated iQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VH[SODQDWRU\PHPRUDQGXP
for the proposal which became Regulation 1/2003´'HFLVLRQVDGRSWHGE\national competition 
authorities do not have legal effects outside the territory of their Member State, nor do they bind 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQµ57  
 
Responses to the White Paper consultation on dDPDJHVDFWLRQVDUJXHGWKDW´JUHDWHUPDWXULW\RI
the ECN and further development of the concept of mutual UHFRJQLWLRQLQ&RPPXQLW\ODZµZDs 
needed before the recognition of NCA decisions by national courts was adopted.58 A general 
principle of administrative cooperation is now incorporated into Article 197 TFEU.59 Others 
have added the awareness of other administrative authorities as a concrete duty of loyal 
cooperation in EU law. De Visser SRVLWVD´QHZGLPHQVLRQWRWKHGXW\RIOR\DOFRRSHUDWLRQ
under Art [4 TEU]: a duty on national authorities to consider actively the output, practices and 
perspectives of their fellow authorities in their own decision-PDNLQJµ 60 In respect of relations 
between agencies in the European Competition Network, Brammer argues that there should be 
´GHIHUHQFHµWRRWKHU1&$GHFLVLRQVRQWKHEDVLVRIOR\DOFRRSHUDWLRQZKLFKZRXOGDPRXQWWRD
case-by-case consideration of the effects of the decision, but apparently not prima facie proof.61  
 
As a result, there is an asymmetry when national judges must treat decisions of foreign NCAs as 
prima facie evidence of an infringement. In this way judges have less competence relative to 
RWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV·FRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULWLHVWKDQFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULWLHVYLV-à-vis their 
counterparts in the European Competition Network. 
 
4.1.2 GUIDANCE TO COURTS ON QUANTIFICATION OF HARM 
 
The probative effect of NCA decisions raises the question of the remaining ambit of judicial 
competence. As discussed above, the national judge would still be responsible for assessing the 
causal link between the infringement and damage to the complainant, effects of the 
infringement, and quantum. -XGJHVDUHQRWTXLWH´PHUHDVVHVVRUVRIGDPDJHVµ62. However, in 
practice these judicial domains are also subject to limitation, albeit by soft law guidance. The 
Commission has issued a Communication and Practical Guide on quantifying antitrust harm in 
                                                          
56
 Supra n. 14. The Notice sets out rules for case allocation, cooperation and consistent application of the EU 
anWLWUXVWUXOHVEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULWLHVDQGWKH'LUHFWRUDWH*HQHUDOIRU&RPSHWLWLRQRI
the European Commission. 
57
 P.17 of the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending 
Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87, COM (2000) 
582 final - 2000/0243 (CNS), O.J. 2000 C 365E/284  
58
 Addleshaw Goddard response to the White Paper on Damages Actions; see also UK Competition Law 
Association; AFEC, Association Française d'Etude de la Concurrence; APDC Association des Avocats 
Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence; Slaughter & May responses  making similar points 
59
 Art. 17)(8³(IIHFWLYHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI8QLRQODZE\WKH0HPEHU6WDWHVZKLFKLVHVVHQWLDOIRUWKH
proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common interest. 
60
 M. de Visser Network-Based Governance in EC Law: the example of EC competition and EC communications 
law (Hart, 2009), p. 388 
61
 S. Brammer Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition 
Law (Hart 2009) p. 432, drawing from Advocate General Van Gerven in C-128/92 H J Banks & Co Ltd v British 
Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209 (cited in Court of Appeal Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company CPC 
[2004] EWCA Civ 637). Brammer also limits the categories of decision to prohibition and fining, excluding 
non-action and commitment decisions.   
62
 A. Komninos 'Effect of Commission Decisions on Private Antitrust Litigation: Setting the story straight' 
(2007) 44(5) Common Market Law Review 1387, p. 1404    
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damages actions. 63  In addition, the new Directive includes the possibility of NCAs acting as 
amicus curiae for the purpose of quantifying damages.64   
 
The Directive on Damages Actions provides for assistance to the judge on quantum according 
to Article 17(3): ´Member States shall ensure that, in proceedings relating to an action for 
damages, a national competition authority may, upon request of a national court, assist that 
national court with respect to the determination of the quantum of damages where that national 
competition authority considers such assistance to be appropriate.µThere are mixed messages 
KHUHFRQFHUQLQJWKHMXGJH·VFRPSHWHQFH7KH1&A should be able to intervene if it (the NCA) 
GHHPVLWDSSURSULDWHZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKH1&$·VULJKWRILQLWLDWLYH2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLWLVWR
´DVVLVWµWKHFRXUWZKLFKVXJJHVWVDPRUHFRRSHUDWLYHUROHZLWKWKHFRXUW A similar focus on the 
1&$·VFRQYHQLHQFe is evident in Article 6(11) in the context of assistance on disclosure of 
evidence, discussed further below.  
 
7KHUHFLWDOVRIWKH'LUHFWLYHDOVRXQGHUOLQHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULWLHV·JXLGDQFH
to courts. According to Recital 46 of the 'LUHFWLYH´0ember States should ensure that, where 
requested, national competition authorities may provide guidance on quantum. In order to 
ensure coherence and predictability the Commission should provide general guidance at Union 
level.µ6SHFLILFDOO\UHgarding the quantification of passing-on of overcharges, Recital 41 states: 
´WKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWVKRXOGKDYHWKHSRZHUWRHVWLPDWHZKLFKVKDUHRIWKHRYHUFKDUJHKDVEHHQ
passed on to the level of indirect purchasers in the dispute pending before it.µ1RQHWKeless, 
Recital 42 observes: ´The Commission should issue clear, simple and comprehensive guidelines 
for national courts on how to estimate the share of the overcharge passed on to indirect 
purchasers.µ 
 
As stated in the Communication on Quantifying Harm, the aim of the Practical Guide LV´to 
offer assistance to national courts and parties involved in actions for damages by making 
information on quantifying harm caused by infringements of the EU competition rules more 
widely available.µ65 The guidance to courts is ´purely informative and does not bind national 
courts or parties. It does not therefore alter the legal rules of the Member States«and does not 
affect the rights and obligations of Member States or of natural or legal persons under EU 
law.µ66 However, the Communication emphasizes that the techniques could be used in 
                                                          
63
 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 2013 C 3440, 11 Jun. 2013, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:167:0019:0021:EN:PDF (last accessed 
29.7.2015) and Practical Guide: Quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union SWD (2013) 205, 11 Jun. 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf (last accessed 29.7.2015) 
64
 $UWLFOH'LUHFWLYH6XFKJXLGDQFHZDVLQLWLDOO\IRUHVHHQLQµ3URYLVLRQRIQRQ-binding 
DVVLVWDQFHIRUTXDQWLILFDWLRQRIGDPDJHV¶DWRIWKH:KLWH3DSHURQ'DPDJHV$FWLRQVIRU%UHDFKRIWKH EC 
Antitrust Rules Impact Assessment Report SEC (2008) 405, 2 Apr. 2008, p. 28. 
65
 Communication on quantifying harm, supra n. 63, at para.11 
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settlement proceedings or alternative dispute resolution as well as in the courtroom.67 There may 
also be spill-over effects for the calculation of damages in other areas of law.68  
 
Despite the non-binding nature of the guidance, some respondents to the earlier White Paper 
consultation also raised concerns in principle about any guidelines restricting the ability of 
national judges to come to their own assessment of quantification of damage.69 This is somewhat 
assuaged by the fact that rather than providing precise formulae, the Practical Guide 
accompanying the Communication on quantification of damages provides a range of suggested 
methods and models. It is therefore a ´WRRONLWµ70 for courts rather than a template. It also 
provides examples from different jurisdictions and legal precedents from the European courts, 
which may make the guidance more amenable to national judges. It would still be for the judge 
to decide on the level of evidence needed to assess quantum. The Communication indicates that 
nothing in the guidance VKRXOGFKDQJHWKHVWDQGDUGRISURRIRU´OHYHORIGHWDLOUHTXLUHGRI
IDFWXDOVXEPLVVLRQVµDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQQDWLRQDOODZ71   
 
/,0,7,1*1$7,21$/&28576·32:(56 OF DISCLOSURE 
 
What is central to WKHFRXUWV·DELOLW\WRDFFXUDWHO\FDOFXODWHGDPDJHVLVDFFHVVWRHYLGHQFH,Q
calculating harm, direct evidence, such as documents on agreed sales figures or price increases, 
would be helpful to the court. This type of evidence is likely to be gained in public enforcement 
by competition authorities, for example through a leniency application, in which a whistle-blower 
comes forward to give evidence of the existence of a cartel. Claimants in damages actions will 
find it easier to prove their loss, as well as the infringement itself, if they have access to these 
leniency documents.  
 
As a result of the CJEU preliminary rulings in Pfleiderer72 and Donau Chemie,73 which left discretion 
to national judges to disclose leniency documents on a case-by-case basis, the interface between 
                                                          
67
 Ibid at para. 11. The earlier Guidance Paper on quantifying damages suggested that the guidance could also be 
used when applying national law - i.e. not only where Article 101 or 102 are concerned, but this reference does 
not seem to have made it into the most recent Communication. See Draft Guidance Paper Quantifying Harm in 
Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Jun. 2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/draft_guidance_paper_en.pdf (last 
accessed 30.7.2015), para. 6 
68
 For example contract, tort, consumer protection, and environmental damage. In a communication about the 
UHSRUWIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQRQFDOFXODWLRQRIGDPDJHVWKHDXWKRUVVXJJHVWWKDW³WKHPHWKRGVDQGPRGHOV
SUHVHQWHGKHUHFDQEHXVHGIRUGDPDJHVHVWLPDWLRQVLQWKRVHGLIIHUHQWOHJDOFRQWH[WVDVZHOO´Oxera Agenda 
briefing: Quantifying Damages: a step towards practical guidance, Jan. 2010, available at 
http://www.oxera.com/cmsDocuments/Agenda_January%2010/Antitrust%20damages.pdf (last accessed 
30.7.2015), p. 6 
69
 %LUG	%LUG:KLWH3DSHUUHVSRQVH³ZHZRXOGFDXWLRQDJDLQVWSURSRVDOVZKLFKFRXOGOLPLWQDWLRQDOFRXUWV¶
DELOLW\WRGHYHORSWKHLURZQMXULVGLFWLRQDOSUDFWLFHIRUGDPDJHVFODLPVE\PDNLQJDQ\µVRIWODZ¶RUJXLGHOLQHV
too prescripWLYH´Association Française des Entreprises Privées White Paper response: ³IXWXUHDWWHPSWVDW
quantification on the part of the Commission would deprive the court of its compensatory function, once again 
HPSW\LQJWKHUROHRIWKHFRXUWRILWVVXEVWDQFH´Possibly this is a misunderstanding ± the Commission is not 
intending to calculate the quantum, but to give methods for doing so. However, it does demonstrate the attitude 
WRµQRQ-ELQGLQJDGYLFH¶LQVRPHTXDUWHUV 
70
 µ4XDQWLI\LQJDQWLWUXVWGDPDJHVWRZDUGVQRQ-ELQGLQJJXLGDQFHIRUFRXUWV¶VWXG\SUHSDUHGIRUWKH(XURSHDQ
Commission by Oxera economic consultancy and a multi-jurisdictional team of lawyers, Jan. 2010, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf  (last accessed 30.7.2015), p. 
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 Communication on quantifying harm, supra n. 63, at para. 13 
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 C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161 at paras. 30-32. In Pfleiderer, the CJEU ruled 
that Regulation 1/2003 did not preclude the possibility of leniency documents being disclosed for the purpose of 
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leniency and damages claims is addressed in the new Directive. These judgments led to alarm 
that competition enforcement would be jeopardized since cartel members would be discouraged 
from reporting each other to a competition authority if they were then going to be liable for 
damages in a private action. The heads of European competition authorities responded with a 
declaration affirming the fundamental importance of the protection of leniency material.74  The 
Amtsgericht Bonn in Pfleiderer ultimately decided that leniency documents were to be protected 
from disclosure.75 However, tKLVFRQWUDVWVZLWKWKH(QJOLVK+LJK&RXUW·VDSSURDFKLn National 
Grid.76 Despite an intervention by the European Commission under Article 15 of Regulation 
1/2003 urging that information specifically prepared for the purpose of an application under its 
leniency programme should not be disclosed,77 that court applied a proportionality test assessing 
(a) whether the information could be obtained from other sources and (b) the relevance of 
leniency materials to the case.78 On this basis the court did allow disclosure of a limited part of 
the confidential version of the Commission·V decision as the materials were relevant and could 
not be obtained from another source.79 The provisions on disclosure in the Damages Directive 
may give rise to further satellite litigation on categories of evidence, which would create a further 
role for national civil courts. 
 
The Directive ensures that national courts do have powers to order disclosure of evidence, while 
also limiting that power. Article 5(2) underlines that requests for information must be specific to 
DYRLG¶ILVKLQJH[SHGLWLRQV·Article 6 separates documents into categories which are subject to 
different disclosure conditions. Leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions to the 
competition authority are protected from disclosure altogether (Art. 6 (6WKH¶EODFNOLVW· The 
FRXUW·VRQO\FRPSHWHQFHKHUHLVWRYHULI\WKDWWKHUHOHYDQWGRFXPHQWVGRLQGHHGPHHWWKH
definitions for those categories (Art. 6(7).80 Documents on the file of the competition authority 
prepared for the purposes of an investigation are temporarily protected pending the final 
GHFLVLRQRIWKHDXWKRULW\WKH¶JUH\OLVW· ² Art. 6(5)).81 All other documents held on the file are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a private action, leaving it to national courts to determine the conditions under which such access must be 
permitted or refused to a claimant by balancing the interests protected by EU law ± that is, the effectiveness of 
leniency programmes and the right to claim damages.     
73
 C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG EU:C:2013:366. In Donau Chemie the CJEU 
ruled that a blanket ban on access to leniency documents is not permitted. A national law which requires the 
consent of all parties before access to the file is given to third-party antitrust damages claimants is incompatible 
with the EU principle of effectiveness (para. 39); and a national court must be able to decide on disclosure 
weighing up the interests in doing so (para. 35). 
74
 European Competition Network Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities 
of 23 May 2012, Protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf   (last accessed 30.7.2015) 
75
 51 Gs 53/09, 18.1.2012 
76
 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and other companies [2011] EWHC 1717 (Ch) 
77
 Hearing of 3 Nov.2011 in National Grid, ibid. &RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQDYDLODEOHDW
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/amicus_curiae_2011_national_grid_en.pdf   (last accessed 30.7.2015) on 
whether national court has jurisdiction to order disclosure of leniency documents submitted to the Commission 
78
 National Grid, ibid, at para. 39 
79
 National Grid, ibid, hearing of 4 Apr. 2012 
80
 See Communication from the Commission ² Amendments to the Commission Notice on the cooperation 
between the Commission and courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, O.J. 
2015 C 256/5, paras. 26 and 26a and Communication from the Commission ² Amendments to the Commission 
Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 
[finding of infringement] and Article 23 [fines] of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases, O.J. 2015 
C 256/2, para. 39 
81
 Art. 6 (5) of the Damages Directive refers to information that was prepared by a natural or legal person 
specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority; information that the competition authority has drawn 
up and sent to the parties in the course of its proceedings; and settlement submissions that have been withdrawn 
by the parties. See also para. 26b of the Courts Notice, ibid. 
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VXEMHFWWRGLVFORVXUHWKH¶ZKLWHOLVW· ² Art 6(9)). In the interests of proportionality, some 
elements of black-listed leniency documents can be disclosed if they contain information in the 
white or grey categories (Art. 6(8)). $VPHQWLRQHGDERYHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH8.+LJK&RXUW·V
UHVSRQVHWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VDWWHPSWWRSUHYHQWOHQLHQF\GRFXPHQWVEHLQJGLVFORVHGLQWKH
National Grid case, this could be a way of courts exercising discretion. 
 
The opportunity for a competition authority to give its views on the disclosure of evidence 
included in its file is addressed in Article 6(11): ´7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWDFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\LV
willing to state its views on the proportionality of disclosure requests, it may, acting on its own 
initiative, submit observations to the national court before which a disFORVXUHRUGHULVVRXJKWµ
7KHGLVFUHWLRQRIWKH1&$HFKRHV$UWLFOHEUHJDUGLQJ1&$V·DGYLFHRQTXDQWXP. There is 
no obligation on the NCA to state its views, WRSURWHFWWKH1&$·s right to consider its own use of 
resourcesEXWWKHUHLVDQREOLJDWLRQRQFRXUWVWRKHDUWKH1&$·VYLHZVLILWFKRRVHVWRVXEPLW
them. 
 
Concerning NCA intervention in civil courts proceedings, the Damages Directive explicitly 
builds upon the existing mechanism in Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003: ´In order to preserve 
the contribution made by public enforcement«, competitLRQDXWKRULWLHVVKRXOG«be able, acting 
upon their own initiative, to submit their observations to a national court for the purpose of 
assessing the proportionality of a disclosure RIHYLGHQFHLQFOXGHGLQWKHDXWKRULWLHV· file... 
Member States should be able to set up a system whereby a competition authority is informed of 
requests for disclosure of information..µ82  
 
4.2 ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY INTERVENTION IN NATIONAL COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
An existing means of linking courts with competition authorities is through opinions to national 
courts under Article 15 Regulation 1/2003. Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 provides for 
Member State courts to ask the Commission to transmit information to them, or to request the 
&RPPLVVLRQ·VQRQ-binding opinion on questions concerning the application of the EU 
competition rules. Article 15(3) allows the Commission to intervene with observations on its 
own initiative ´ZKHUHWKHFRKHUHQWDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOH>@RU[102] of the Treaty so 
UHTXLUHVµ NCAs may intervene on issues relating to the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.  
 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ$UWLFOH´has most often been used by national courts to 
REWDLQLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHVWDWHRISURFHHGLQJVRIFDVHVLQYHVWLJDWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQµ83 
However, there are a number of instances where more substantive opinions have been 
requested. To date the Commission has given 31 opinions in response to requests from national 
courts.84 The requests from courts relate to range of issues including market definition, the 
qualification of a practice as an abuse, and the applicability of Article 101(3) TFEU.  
 
Since the national court initiates the request under Article 15(1), on the face of it there is little 
concern about judicial autonomy. However, if the juGJHHVVHQWLDOO\WUDQVSRVHVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·V
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 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: 
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opinion, the Commission may indirectly influence the case.85 Broberg and Fenger suggest that in 
policy areas where the Commission can issue binding decisions, such as in competition and State 
aid, the Commission ´DUJXDEO\ERWKFDQDQGVKRXOGDVVLVWWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWµ86 The Commission 
is careful to stipulate that its opinions are given without prejudice to the interpretation of the 
CJEU through the possibility or obligation of the court to have recourse to the preliminary 
reference procedure. However, in applying and enforcing the law the Commission may add its 
own ² subjective ² views on how a particular case law or Treaty or secondary law provision 
should be understood,87 or extend its scope. In those circumstances, it would overstep the 
boundaries of its powers and circumvent the role of the CJEU. 88 
 
For the purposes of the judicial autonomy discussion, Article 15(3) is more significant as it 
allows the Commission and NCAs the possibility of making submissions on their own initiative in 
cases in national courts. Both the Commission and national competition authority are free to 
VXEPLWDZULWWHQDPLFXVEULHIWRWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWEXWLWLVDWWKHMXGJH·VGLVFUHWLRQWRDGPLWRUDO
submissions in the proceedings. To date the Commission has intervened 17 times.89 The 
&RPPLVVLRQ·V&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWHQ\HDUVRI5HJXODWLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHXVHRI
Article 15(3) is becoming more frequent, with 10 interventions in 2009-2014 compared to 3 in 
the first 5 years of the Regulation.90 
 
In Regulation 1/2003, the key element for WKH&RPPLVVLRQ·Vown-initiative intervention under 
$UWLVVWDWHGWREH´FRKHUHQWDSSOLFDWLRQµRIWKHFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHV´&RKHUHQWµDSSOLFDWLRQ
RI(8ODZKDVEHHQLQWHUSUHWHGDV´HIIHFWLYHµapplication.91 The Commission has intervened, for 
example, on limitation periods,92 on liability for fines in the context of economic succession,93 to 
protect confidentiality of documents in the context of actions for damages for breach of the 
competition rules,94 to protect the deterrent effect of fines,95 on parallel application of EU and 
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 )RUIXOOHUGLVFXVVLRQVHH.:ULJKWµ7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V2ZQµ3UHOLPLQDU\5HIHUHQFH3URFHGXUH¶LQ
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assistance that the Treaty has placed in the hands of the Court of Justice could constitute a µdétournement de 
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 See European Commission Directorate-General for Competition amicus curiae webpage 
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Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication on Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under 
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 Commission Staff Working Document, ibid. 
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 WKH 3UHOLPLQDU\
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 Morgan Advanced Materials v. Deutsche Bahn [2014] UKSC 24 (UK Supreme Court, 9 Apr. 2014); 
European Commission opinion available at DG COMP amicus curiae webpage, supra. n. 89 
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COMP amicus curiae webpage, ibid. 
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national law,96 WRVDIHJXDUGWKH(8·VMXULVGLFWLRQE\GHILQLQJthe effect on trade between 
Member States widely;97 on how block and individual exemptions to the competition rules 
should be appliedSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRI¶REMHFW·DJUHHPHQWV;98and to ensure that a 
preliminary ruling is applied.99 
 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ·VCommunication on the first 10 years of Regulation 1/2003 explicitly states 
that the Article 15(2) obligation on Member States to forward court judgments to the 
&RPPLVVLRQLVLQWHUDOLD´WRHQDEOHWKH&RPPLVVLRQWREHFRPHDZDUHRIFDVHVIRUZKLFKLWPLJKW
be appropriate to submit (in the next instance [ i.e. at appeal stage]) observations to national 
FRXUWV«µ100 This mechanism has not worked optimally to date, and it has been proposed that 
the Commission and NCAs should consider how best to make use of their ´MRLQWFRPSHWHQFHµ
under Article 15(3).101 This suggests a greater involvement in court proceedings in the future, or 
at least a higher degree of monitoring. As discussed above, the exercise of this joint competence 
is likely to be used specifically to advise on quantum and disclosure of evidence. For example, 
Recital 15 of the Damages Directive stDWHVWKDW´«:KHUHWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWZLVKHVWRRUGHU
disclosure of evidence by the Commission, the principle of sincere cooperation between the 
European Union and the Member States (Article 4(3) TEU) and Article 15(1) of Regulation No 
1/2003 as regards requests for information are applicable.µ 
 
In addition, relatively wide jurisdiction for the Commission to intervene has been supported by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union itself. This is particularly evident in Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst v X BV102, which explicitly addressed admissibility of Article 15(3) interventions; 
but also through RWKHUUHIHUHQFHVLQ&RXUWFDVHODZWRQDWLRQDOMXGJHV·SRVVLELOLW\WRDVNWKH
Commission for an opinion.103 In X BV, the CJEU ruled that a Member State court was required 
WRDFFHSWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VRZQ-initiative written observation not only when the judge is 
actually applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, ´even if the proceedings do not pertain WRµWKH
application of Articles 101 and 102 but also where proceedings in some way link to the effective 
application of those Articles.104In particular, the CJEU said that the effectiveness of the fines 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
95
 X BV v. Inspecteur Belastingdienst, case 06/00252 of 11 Mar. 2010 (Gerechtshof Amsterdam, Netherlands) 
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 C-681/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & Co. and Others EU:C:2013:404. 
In Schenker Advocate General Kokott highlighted the importance of Commission opinions alongside the Court 
RI-XVWLFH¶VRSLQLRQFRQFHUQLQJOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHSDUWLHVSDUD 
104
 X BV judgment, supra n. 91, para. 30 of the judgment (emphasis added). X BV concerned the question of tax 
GHGXFWLELOLW\XQGHU'XWFKODZRIDILQHIROORZLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSODVWHUERDUGFDUWHOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ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imposed by the Commission under Article 103(2) TFEU is a condition for the coherent 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as WKH\DUHXVHGWR´HQVXUHFRPSOLDQFHµDQG
´HIIHFWLYHVXSHUYLVLRQµ.105  
 
While judicial autonomy was not explicitly addressed in X BV, it is implicit in the Advocate 
*HQHUDO·VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWVXFKDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ GRHVQRWHQFURDFKRQ0HPEHU6WDWHV·SURFHGXUDO
autonomy.106 In its arguments to the Court, the Commission couched the potential to intervene 
in terms of its own margin of appreciation, rather than the discretion of the national court to use 
its observations. The Advocate General seemed to subscribe to WKLVYLHZUHIHUULQJWRWKH¶ULJKW·
of the Commission to submit written observations,107 although the Court itself referred to an 
¶RSWLRQ·WRLQWHUYHQH 108 
 
The Advocate General in X BV alluded to the Commission ensuring coherent application 
regarding the effects of one of its own decisions (rather than, for example, in a follow-on action 
from an NCA). However, the CJEU did not expressly make this limitation. Within the context of 
the ECN the Commission or another NCA FRXOGLQWHUYHQHWRVXSSRUWDQ1&$·VGHFLVLRQThe 
conditions for NCAs to intervene differ from those for the European Commission. While the 
ODWWHUPXVWEHFRQFHUQHGDERXW´FRKHUHQWDSSOLFDWLRQµRI(8ODZD1&$ may submit 
observations to the national courts of its own 0HPEHU6WDWH´RQLVVXHVUHODWLQJWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
RI$UWLFOH>RU7)(8@µ109 In the Council negotiations on Regulation 1/2003 this 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ1&$V·DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VFRPSHWHQFHGRHVQRWVHHPWR have been an 
explicit issue. There is nothing specific about the differentiated circumstances in which NCAs 
and the Commission would intervene. However, some Member States took positions on NCAs 
acting as intermediaries of the Commission.110 As mentioned above, tKH&RPPLVVLRQ·V
implementation plan accompanying the Directive on damages actions also proposes that the 
&RPPLVVLRQDQG1&$VPDNHEHWWHUXVHRIWKHLU´MRLQWFRPSHWHQFHµWRLQWHUYHQHXQGHU$UW. 
15(3) of Regulation 1/2003.111 
 
Currently, Article 15(3) states that NCAs PD\VXEPLWREVHUYDWLRQV´WRWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWVRItheir 
0HPEHU6WDWH«µ There are two possible scenarios IRUH[HUFLVLQJWKH¶MRLQWFRPSHWHQFH·
envisaged: (a) NCA from Member State A directly provides advice to a court in Member State B. 
SiQFH0HPEHU6WDWHVFRXUWVDUHUHTXLUHGWRDFFHSWIRUHLJQ1&$V·ILQGLQJRILQIULQJHPHQWDV
prima facie evidence, it is submitted that NCAs should have a corresponding specific horizontal 
duty of cooperation to assist civil courts in other Member States. However, this should be at the 
initiative of the national court. (b) TKH¶MRLQWFRPSHWHQFH·EHWZHHQ1&$VDQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
LVGHYHORSHG)RUH[DPSOH1&$$·VILQGLQJRILQIULQJHPHQW, as a transnational administrative 
act, 112 is discussed within the European Competition Network and NCA B intervenes to give 
advice in a follow-RQDFWLRQLQ0HPEHU6WDWH%·VFRXUW 
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The mechanisms linking competition authorities with courts represent a mix of soft law and hard 
law. Hard law tools include national authority decisions as proof in civil courts, and the 
requirement not to make a decision running counter to one by the Commission (Masterfoods, 
Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003) and soft law (opinions to court and guidance on disclosure and 
quantum). Although the content of the opinion is not binding, according to WKH&-(8·VFDVHODZ 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VYLHZPXVWbe admitted to the proceedings. These developments in 
competition law have wider implications at national level for the relationship between 
administrative authorities and courts which have previously been underexplored in the literature. 
They may also reflect a wider trend of the limitation of institutional autonomy.113  
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This contribution has explored how the new EU Antitrust Damages Directive and linked 
LQLWLDWLYHVDIIHFWWKHDPELWRIQDWLRQDOFRXUWV·FRPSHWHQFHThe aim of the Directive is to remove 
obstacles to damages actions for plaintiffs and thus to increase the number of claims in civil 
courts, while preserving public enforcement by competition authorities. Decentralization of EU 
competition law enforcement and the drive for more actions for damages in national courts on 
the one hand empowers judges. However, in a number of ways the tools for linking together 
public (competition authority) and private (court) enforcers efficiently also constrain FRXUWV·
jurisdiction.  This is largely as a result of the YDULRXV¶MXGLFLDO· functions taken on by executive 
authorities in competition enforcement. It also results from the inability to link all judges into the 
(XURSHDQ&RPSHWLWLRQ1HWZRUNDQGWKHSHUFHLYHGQHHGWR¶UHLQWKHPLQ·E\RWKHUPHDQV This 
limitation occurs through the interaction of hard and soft law tools. 
 
The article focused on a number of provisions in the new Directive and in the existing 
Regulation 1/2003 which connect regulatory authorities to judicial proceedings. In terms of hard 
ODZDQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\·VILQGLQJRIDQLQfringement must be accepted as 
´irrefutably establishedµ in the same Member State. A number of constitutional objections on 
grounds of judicial autonomy were raised to the initial proposal for all NCA decisions to be 
¶ELQGLQJ·RQQDWLRQDOFRXUWVLQVXEVHTXHQWGDPDJHVDFWLons throughout the EU. The solution to 
this appears to be a semantic one, by packaging the finding of infringement as an irrebuttable 
presumption. This compromise is the result of a balancing exercise between judicial autonomy 
DQGDOOHYLDWLQJDFODLPDQW·Vburden of proof. A finding of infringement from another Member 
State must be accepted as at least prima facie evidence of a breach of competition law in actions 
for damages throughout the EU. A judge could still retain some jurisdiction here in establishing 
WKHVFRSHRIWKHFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\·VGHFLVLRQ 
 
A particular concern of the Directive is to regulate disclosure of documents on a competition 
DXWKRULW\·VILOHSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHREWDLQHGWKURXJKOHQLHQF\SURFHGXUHV7KH'irective ensures 
that national courts do have powers to order disclosure of evidence, while also limiting that 
power. According to previous CJEU case law national judges were able to decide on disclosure 
of all categories of evidence on a case-by-case basis, balancing the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes with the right to claim damages. The Directive closes the door to this. However, a 
judge could gain some jurisdiction in expected satellite litigation around categories of evidence 
and permissibility of disclosure. 
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In terms of soft law, a competition authority may provide advice to a national court on whether 
certain documents from its file should be disclosed, and on the quantification of damages. There 
DUHPL[HGPHVVDJHVKHUHFRQFHUQLQJWKHMXGJH·VFRPSHWHQFH7KH1&$VKRXOGEH able to 
LQWHUYHQHLILWGHHPVLWDSSURSULDWHZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKH1&$·VULJKWRILQLWLDWLYH2QWKHRWKHU
KDQGLWLVWR´DVVLVWµWKHFRXUWZKLFKVXJJHVWVDPRUH cooperative role.   
 
These advice mechanisms are explicitly connected to the existing Article 15 of Regulation 
1/2003 on the enforcement of the EU competition rules, according to which European 
Commission and national competition authority are empowered to give opinions to national 
courts on the interpretation and application of EU law. This contribution demonstrated how 
Article 15 has been used to date, giving an indication of how regulatory authorities might interact 
with courts in the future when the Damages Directive comes into force. 7KH&-(8·VFDVHODZ
has already shown that the jurisdiction for the European Commission to intervene in national 
judicial proceedings is wide.   
 
We are likely to see more interaction between courts and competition authorities, particularly on 
disclosure and quantum, and NCAs might intervene on behalf of their counterparts in other 
Member States. The European Commission has also underlined its ambition for the Commission 
and NCAs to use their joint competence to intervene more effectively. Since Member States 
courts are required to DFFHSWIRUHLJQ1&$V·ILQGLQJs of infringement as prima facie evidence, 
NCAs should have a corresponding specific duty of cooperation to assist civil courts in other 
Member States. However, this contribution argues that the request for assistance should be 
initiated by the national court. 
 
In contributing to the understanding of the interaction of courts and regulatory authorities in the 
enforcement of EU law, this article has also tackled the meaning of judicial autonomy in context. 
If judicial independence is viewed not as a static, separate notion but as a functional concept, it 
must be assessed in relation to the result which is sought. If we accept this functional definition, 
judicial independence per se is not threatened. However, the scope RIFRXUWV·MXULVGLFWLRQLV 
certainly affected. This is perhaps an inevitable trade-off with the efficiency of public 
enforcement by regulatory authorities.  
 
 
 
